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Introduction
Perhaps I should begin by declaring what it is that I am not setting out to do in this paper:
I am not attempting to convince the reader that God exists or does not exist, or even that belief in
God is reasonable or unreasonable. I only intend to show that certain theistic arguments
formulated upon similar lines rely on fallacious reasoning and ought not to convince us. Even in
spite of the fallacious character I attribute to these arguments, I have some praise for them mixed
in with the criticism, as will be seen: I think these arguments help to put speculative philosophy
onto a better footing than it enjoys in more standard treatments. In particular, I think that the
emphasis on evaluating parallel cases taken from everyday thinking is a wonderful attempt to
seek a middle ground between the alleged relativistic free-for-all of postmodernism and the
opposite extreme, exemplified in logical positivism and related approaches to philosophy
wherein the temptation, if not the rule, is to discard talk about religion, ethics, and values as
‘meaningless.’ My complaint against Shalkowski and van Inwagen here is not that they have
made a wrong turn, but rather that, having set off in the right direction, they give us an
incomplete picture of the terrain at which they have arrived. In backing up this contention, I take
a considerable detour through the borderland between formal and informal reasoning, remarking
on the differences I see between the two: hence, my claims regarding the proper method of
philosophising end up overshadowing the theological question I begin by considering.

Traditional Arguments and Plantinga’s ‘Reformed Objection’
First, I would like to wind back the philosophical clock to a time prior to the arrival of
Plantinga, Shalkowski and van Inwagen on the scene: let us say to the academic climate of thirty
or forty years ago.
This climate (within the English-speaking philosophical world, at least) is rather a bleak
one for a theist: it is generally accepted that one needs strong arguments for the beliefs one holds
and that faith without argumentative reason is philosophically unworthy of respect, to say the
least. At the same time, the traditional arguments for God’s existence – the teleological,
ontological, and cosmological arguments; the moral argument, arguments from miracles, etc. –
are all getting much the worst of things. It seems that theistic belief is just not viable, barring
one of three contingencies: either it must be shown that the objections made against these theistic
arguments are not as strong as they appear; or that new versions of these traditional arguments
can be formulated cogently, bypassing these objections; or that there are entirely new theistic
arguments that meet with no such difficulties.
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However, an entirely different way forward was advocated by Alvin Plantinga in his
1980 paper ‘The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology.’ This paper avoids all these modes
of improving religious apologetics and instead seeks to justify belief in God without the use of
direct arguments. Hence the term ‘Reformed’ in the title: the Reformed churches have, as
Plantinga says, “for the most part taken a dim view” of using argument rather than faith as the
basis for belief; and he attempts here to find some philosophical justification for this. What he
presents, in the end, is the idea of theistic belief as ‘properly basic.’ That is, while he keeps to a
foundationalist epistemology, he points out that in any such structure there must be some
bedrock beliefs without (by definition) anything supporting them: these beliefs are simply
intuitively clear or acceptable for some other reason; and while we can dispute the lineage of our
more advanced beliefs, once we trace them back to the bedrock there can be no further demand
for justification. My account of Plantinga here is, admittedly, incomplete: he does attempt to
explain (though without much clarity or success, in my opinion) why this approach would not
allow people simply to claim that the existence of the Great Pumpkin or similar unlikely entities
could also be properly basic. But already the stage has been set for the heroes of the piece,
Shalkowski and van Inwagen: so in the interests of time I will move on to them now.

Shalkowski and the ‘Burden of Proof’ Question
In ‘Atheological Apologetics,’ Scott Shalkowski argues along a somewhat similar line to
that taken by Plantinga, but to my mind Shalkowski’s argument is more initially plausible. In
Shalkowski’s paper, we are asked to think of the theistic hypothesis not in terms of its role at the
foundation of a belief system, but rather as something to be argued for or against in a debate.
Shalkowski is opposed, in particular, to the presumption of atheism. He claims that such a
presumption is arbitrary and unfair, and attacks even the general notion that “positive existence
claims require proof or evidence” in ways that negative existence claims do not. In response to
the question as to whether there is a coherent distinction between claims of these two types, he
replies, “I am not sure that there is. Suppose one fully delineated all the things in one’s ontology
and added that these are all the individuals there are. Is such a claim a positive claim, since it
says only what there is and does not directly say anything about nonexistence, or is it a negative
claim by virtue of the fact that it says the given list is exhaustive?”
I hope I am not misrepresenting Shalkowski’s intentions here in representing his insight
in the following formalistic manner: suppose that I hold to a belief characterized by the letter A,
and that you hold that I am mistaken: you believe ~A. Now, each of our beliefs is likely to be a
belief of a composite sort: let’s imagine that A represents the formula ~(pvq) and that ~A
represents, therefore, (pvq). Which of us in fact adheres to the positive claim, and which the
negative one? Even if we say that we are interested in the sentences only after they have been
spelled out in the greatest detail atomically, who is to judge whether this has been achieved?
Further, are you justified, or not, in claiming that ~(pvq) is actually (~p^~q), and that your own
belief of (pvq) is actually ~(~p^~q)? Can the application of DeMorgan’s theorem really shift the
burden of proof form one side of a dispute to another?
Nor do we seem to respect these distinctions in other ways: as Shalkowski points out, it is
considered “well nigh impossible” to defeat one who, like Sextus Empiricus, is sceptical about
the existence of external objects. However, he points out, even atheists feel justified in
continuing to believe in such objects in the absence of a cogent argument.
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Shalkowski’s point in all this is that it is unfair to consider theists to be unreasonable
simply because they cannot provide a convincing argument for one of their central beliefs. If the
shoe were on the other foot, as Shalkowski argues it may as well be, the atheist would not fare
any better: it is just not the case, in his words, that there is “an a priori, non-context-sensitive
presumption in favour of atheism” and neither is there an unproblematic and convincing
argument to that conclusion. He is not entirely clear as to what would constitute an argument
strong enough for that purpose, though he does outline a sufficient one: “Surely, one would have
a successful disproof of the existence of God, if one could show that there is some internal
metaphysical impossibility in the matter” – in other words, if one could show that the notion of
God is self-contradictory. However, his general point is merely that the theist and the atheist
should be at equal liberty to start the game off by demanding evidence from or attacking the
other, on an equal playing field.

Van Inwagen and the Argument from Evil
A natural response to Shalkowski here would be to claim that there are, in fact, strong
arguments against theism; even ones that show the theistic hypothesis to be self-contradictory
(for example, those to do with the inconsistency of a universe containing both free will and an
omniscient being). Shalkowski counters such claims by pointing out that in fact they are only
arguments against a particular conception of a personal God, and that there are many conceptions
of God that do not require all the attributes attacked in stereotyped atheistic arguments.
However, even where the deity in question does appear to have characteristics that are
incompatible with others or with the world in which we live – such as the characteristics of
omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence in a world where natural and moral evil exist –
the game is not yet up for the religious apologist: or so Peter van Inwagen argues in his paper on
the subject.
Van Inwagen, along with many others, has pointed out that the argument from evil
cannot, contrary to how it has sometimes been represented, constitute a logical refutation of
theism: it only gives us a prima facie reason (albeit in some cases a remarkably strong one) for
thinking that God, under a certain description, does not exist. There has never been, that is, a
knockdown logical proof showing that there can be no possible explanation for God’s allowing
human and animal suffering, even an explanation given by God himself after the rapture.
Van Inwagen does not deny that suffering (for which he uses the term ‘S’) does exist, or
that it presents strong initial evidence against theism. He suspects, however, that atheists arguing
on the basis of such evidence underestimate the options open to the theist who wishes to resist
the hypothesis of an indifferent God or of no God (what van Inwagen calls ‘HI’).
First of all, van Inwagen argues that the atheist’s attack must imply that S is not only
unlikely given theism, but also that it is even more unlikely than it would be given HI. After all,
it would hardly be fair to deride the theist’s inability to account for evil if the atheist has an
equally difficult time explaining it. The atheist here is likely to see the theist’s defensive options
as follows:
-the theist may argue that S is much more surprising, given HI, than one might suppose
-the theist may argue that S is much less surprising, given theism, than one might suppose
-the theist may argue that there are reasons for preferring theism to HI that outweigh the
prima facie reason for preferring HI to theism that we have provided.
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But van Inwagen objects: “This list of options seems to me to be incomplete. Suppose
that one were successfully to argue that S was not surprising on theism – and not because S was
‘just what one would expect’ if theism were true, but because no one is in a position to know
whether S is what one should expect if theism were true.” The difficulty is that we are not in an
epistemic position to assign a probability to S on either hypothesis in a non-arbitrary way: and “if
one is not in a position to assign any epistemic probability to S on theism – if one is not in a
position even to assign a probability range like “high” or “low” or “middling” to S on theism –
then, obviously, one is not in a position to say that the epistemic probability of S on HI is higher
than the probability of S on theism.” Hence, the argument from evil fails to show that the
Christian is being unreasonable in believing in spite of S.

‘Sidewalk Crack’ Belief and the ‘Argument of Yogurt’
At the start of his article van Inwagen says that, when one wants to show the plausibility
of an objection against a certain argument, “[o]ne can try to find a ‘parallel’ argument that is
obviously faulty and try to show that a parallel diagnosis…can be given, a diagnosis that seems
plausible, and hope that some of the plausibility of the parallel diagnosis will rub off on the
original.” In keeping with this suggestion, I would like to use Shalkowski’s standards to assess
the parallel case of someone who has taken all too seriously the children’s maxim, “Step on a
crack, break your mother’s back”; who goes through life meticulously avoiding stepping on
sidewalk cracks; and who refuses to abandon this practice until it can be proved that there is
something internally contradictory with it, or that some fact about the world falsifies his
hypothesis (hence putting the burden of proof on the rest of us). Is it fair to call such a person
unreasonable? Of course it is. But Shalkowski may object that this is not really a parallel case to
theistic belief but rather a straw man: after all, it would be easy to demonstrate that such a belief
about sidewalks is in contradiction with the facts. But then, the same can be said for primitive,
literalistic Christianity, Judaism, etc. One could easily show that these beliefs are mistaken by
demonstrating that there is not a solid firmament between the earth and the heavens, or that hares
do not chew the cud, or that Jesus did not in fact return within the same generation that witnessed
his first appearance on earth. However, Shalkowski is no doubt defending a much more refined
and considered belief here: one that takes many statements in scripture to have meanings other
than their most obvious ones, and the Bible as a text that can be understood only through
sophisticated hermeneutics.
Similarly, therefore, my sidewalk-crack believer has seen people who have stepped on
cracks with no apparent harm besetting their mothers. But, unwilling to abandon his belief, he
has modified it instead. Now he claims that the back-breaking occurs only at the moment of
one’s mother’s death, right after she has lost the ability to communicate, or grimace in pain, or
show in any other way what she undergoes; that it takes place in a manner that is invisible to an
onlooker and the most advanced tools of modern neuroscience; and that it is the worst thing a
mother could ever feel. So there he goes through his adulthood, dancing oddly down the
sidewalk in avoidance of sidewalk cracks. Is there anything unreasonable here?
It is evident at once, of course, that the manner in which the sidewalk-crack believer
came up with these ideas is rather silly, that switching from simple sidewalk-crack belief to the
later version is a falsification evasion, and that both these things might also be said about
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Shalkowski’s theist. However, these objections are strictly speaking counter to the norms of
mainstream analytic philosophy, according to which we must evaluate propositions either by
their internal structure or by the states of affairs to which they refer – not by psychological
accounts of how those individuals who happen to hold them came to do so and why. This will be
taken up later: for now, I request that the reader decide whether this ‘sidewalk’ character can be
considered unreasonable, and on what basis.
Let us turn now to a different example, parallel to van Inwagen’s defence against the
argument from evil: a case in which someone maintains a belief that does appear to be falsifiable
and falsified. This person is Anna, who holds the belief that yogurt is the nation’s least favourite
food. Bonita is tired of hearing Anna talk about this, so she conducts her own research into the
matter. This involves reading business reports, looking at the well-known ‘Most Popular Food
Index,’ making spot checks in the back rooms of supermarkets to ensure that the product really is
being sold, installing hidden cameras in random household dining rooms and kitchens to see that
the yogurt really is being eaten and not dumped down the sink or used for recreational purposes,
etc. After a year of this, she compiles her research and presents Anna with a mountain of
evidence.
But to her surprise, Anna is unimpressed. She asks whether Bonita is willing to concede
that there may be some mysterious factor of which we are not yet aware, which causes people to
eat yogurt and pretend to enjoy it, despite the fact that it is their least favourite food. Bonita
concedes that this possibility exists, however remote. Anna then asks Bonita to provide her with
the probability of her evidence coming out the way it did given a world without that mysterious
factor, and to compare it numerically with the probability of the same outcome, given a world
with the mysterious factor. Bonita protests that she can’t put an exact number to it, and that since
she doesn’t know anything about the mysterious factor, she doesn’t even feel comfortable
providing a range. Anna replies that Bonita obviously still has a great deal of work to do, and
that in the meantime she is perfectly entitled to keep on believing and saying that yogurt is the
least popular food, just as if Bonita had shown her nothing at all. Bonita disagrees, but isn’t sure
whether she’s justified in saying that Anna is being unreasonable here. Is she?

To Solve, or to Sidestep?
I strongly suspect the reader will agree with me when I say that Anna and the sidewalkcrack-avoider are both being clearly unreasonable. Moreover, if I knew anyone who denied this,
I have little doubt that I would find his or her life filled with clear contradictions of the principle
followed by these two fictional characters; and that I could drive such a person to annoyance
and/or an admission of error by adhering to the same principle in everyday interactions with
him/her. But if someone claimed to be uninterested in such examples of practical hypocrisy and
demanded a clear, non-intuitive, logical refutation of the claim that such instances of belief are
reasonable, I would be at a loss. I do not, as I will explain, think this to be possible given the
standard presuppositions and techniques of philosophy today – unless, as we frequently see
happening, commonsensical premises and modes of thinking are illicitly smuggled into the
philosophical framework; or if we are heedless as to whether, in attempting the odd task of
defining the term ‘reasonable’ once and for all (so that intuitive judgement need never be used),
we define it in such a way that it fails to pick out many propositions that are essential for the
daily thinking and conversation of philosophers and non-philosophers alike.

5

J. Kalef’s “Informal Logic and the Philosophy of Religion”

Before I show why this is, however, I should stop to rule out a pseudo-philosophical
approach which, while it has been famously debunked for several decades now, still rears its
head from time to time. This is important here because some philosophers will be tempted to
sidestep the entire issue using a certain type of trick, rather than patiently to reconcile
Shalkowski’s and van Inwagen’s conclusions with my own. I am referring to the verification
principle and to naïve versions of the falsification principle (that is, versions that attempt to do
away with intuitive judgement). Surely, these are both good principles to use in some cases.
However, the preposterous approach to philosophy in which any statement is considered
‘meaningless’ unless it can be traced back to a tautology or a direct observation by simple,
previously established rules is well-known to be unusable. In applying such a principle, one
loses the ability to recommend or justify the principle itself (for how can one describe its merits
without talking about what is ‘good’ in philosophy – a value judgement that is neither directly
observable nor tautological)?
Again, I am aware that I am saying nothing new here, but I repeat what has long been
obvious for the sake of the large number of philosophers who seem to have continued with this
way of thinking regardless of its clear refutation; and also because there is a second, and to my
mind even more important, problem with such thinking – a problem that is as much evident in
some later approaches to philosophy as it is in logical positivism. The problem is that, in
dismissing out of hand such questions as the existence of God, ethical problems, the political
good life, and so on, these approaches simply admit their own inadequacy. We are led into
philosophy, to a very large degree, by a desire to understand such things as the nature of the good
life, the question of God’s existence, and so on; if a philosopher tells us that it is impossible to
discuss these questions under the present system, then surely this is a reason to reject the system,
not the questions that led us there. If a car mechanic told me, upon my arrival at the shop, that
the work cannot begin before mechanics agree on how the term ‘repairing’ can be defined
without invoking some arcane teleology, or that no car can ever be coherently repaired, or that a
good mechanic leaves everything as it is, or that other mechanics only appear to fix cars but in
fact are more confused than their customers, I would be unimpressed and would take my car
elsewhere, regardless of any clever objections to the effect that those mechanics who repair cars
in advance of a theory of car repair are substandard. Nor do I see why we should hold
philosophers to a lower standard than auto mechanics.
But is it possible to avoid this pitfall and seek out an answer to the theological issue I
have raised here, simultaneously keeping to the ideal of a formal logical model? Not only does
this seem highly unlikely, but in fact it is assumptions originating from this background model
that allow us to be misled by Shalkowski and van Inwagen in the first place. I will now explain
why this is.

The Formal Backdrop of Analytic Philosophy
C. L. Hamblin points out in his seminal work Fallacies that “there is much in logic that
has not changed since Aristotle.” Among these constant themes are the ideas that “the logical
unit is the proposition, and its leading logical property is its truth-value (truth or falsity), whence
it is associated with the concepts of negation, of contradiction, and ‘excluded middle”; that
“proof is conceived as a kind of deduction, knock-down, non-cumulative”; and that “the theory is
impersonal and context-free” (p.192). To these logical presuppositions, I would add a linguistic
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one that seems to be held implicitly or explicitly by a great number of modern philosophers: that
any meaningful word or phrase must have a limited number of definitions, all of which must
ultimately be definable in advance of their use in particular contexts; and further, that if someone
is unable to specify in advance just those types of cases where the term is applicable, it follows
that the person does not really know how to use the term. These ideas, and many more, form the
backbone of much modern philosophy in the English-speaking world – but not one of them is
essential in order to think about philosophical topics.
We now have all that is needed, I think, to see how Shalkowski and van Inwagen
(whether intentionally or not) are able to spin their illusory webs. Central to both papers is the
idea that belief in a personal deity, while perhaps not the sort of thing that one could justify
through argument, is nonetheless ‘reasonable.’ But what does this term, ‘reasonable,’ mean?
There can be no question that it is a meaningful word, and that we know how to use it, even if
there are some occasions where it is questionable whether it should be applied. If you have
followed this paper up to this point, you will be in no position to deny this: I sneakily requested
you to consider to yourself whether Anna and the sidewalk man are reasonable, and if you do not
understand the meaning of the term, you will have been unable to begin to think about this, let
alone to arrive at a conclusion for yourself. But defining the term in a way that many
philosophers demand is altogether more difficult.
This becomes clear when we take into consideration what Hamblin says about the logical
property of any proposition being its binary truth-value. We find ourselves at once in a problem
I call ‘the poverty of logical semantics.’ Just where are the lines of reasonableness to be drawn
against such a background? First, we may cut off those propositions that involve an internal
contradiction, or that make a claim about the world that can clearly be falsified by simple,
judgement-free and direct observation – these propositions are not reasonable because they are
demonstrably false. In this case, because the great majority of propositions in philosophy –the
existence of God being a good, if extreme, example -- cannot be falsified by ‘impersonal and
context-free’ comparisons with observable data, Shalkowski finds himself unable to specify what
could undermine the reasonableness of theistic belief short of a self-contradiction in the concept,
as we have seen.
On the opposite end of things, we have propositions that are more than simply
reasonable: they are demonstrably true. In all these cases, we have a ‘knock-down, noncumulative’ proof, either in the form of a tautology or of a claim that can be compared without
the use of human judgement or even the suspicion thereof with clearly observable data and
shown to be true.
And in the middle, we have… everything else. Now it should be evident why I have
referred to the ‘poverty of logical semantics’: a vast number of the propositions we require for
everyday and philosophical use are in the strange middle-ground of the logically possible or
contingent, and the boundaries erected at the top and bottom of this category have removed
almost nothing. Propositions we would normally dismiss out of hand, like sidewalk-crack belief
and yogurt denial, inhabit this range; as do propositions we would normally accept without
hesitation, like sidewalk-crack scepticism and the proposition that yogurt is not the least popular
food. So do propositions like belief in God and belief in external objects, all lying somewhere in
the vast range of those propositions that are not ruled out by either of the small ‘no fly’ zones to
the north and south. But if the term ‘reasonable’ is to be defined clearly before we use it (as we
are told it must be), then how are we to define it such that it can distinguish propositions within
the central zone, given that formal logic can go no further?
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Supposing we wish to keep to the rule of distinguishing the reasonable from the
unreasonable in a context-independent and intuition-free way, all we are left with is probability
theory – hence van Inwagen’s emphasis on it in his paper, and his conclusion that our failure to
assign a probability range to a proposition leaves us unable to attack that proposition as
unreasonable. But my yogurt example seems to show that there are cases where we can apply
the term ‘unreasonable’ without being able to specify a range; and indeed probability theory does
not take us much further than formal logic. This can be seen once we have begun an attempt at
definition. It is clear that an uncertain proposition will need a fairly high probability to be
considered reasonable. If a computer were to pick out the name of a random Canadian from
census files and I declared that person to be female (just because I know that the female-male
ratio is slightly higher than 1:1), that would not be considered reasonable despite the fact that I
am more likely right than wrong. But how high a probability is to be demanded? And is the
probability at which the proposition becomes a reasonable one the same throughout all different
areas of inquiry? This seems highly unlikely. Also, intuition-free probability theory fails to
work in a surprising number of cases. Which is more probable: that Bertrand Russell’s birth
certificate bore the wrong date, or that A. J. Ayer’s did? Should we just say that each one is
‘pretty unlikely’ without assigning a probability to each or ranking either as more unlikely than
the other? Or, what level of probability should we demand in order for the acceptance of a new
scientific theory to be reasonable? In many cases we can work out quite precisely the probability
that certain scientific results would come about purely through chance. But don’t we need to
weigh this against the evidence on the other side – and can we do that without taking into
consideration the initial implausibility of such a hypothesis? What level of experimental
probability should it take to convince someone that salt is sodium chloride, compared with the
hypothesis that we are descended from Martians? Does not the counter-intuitiveness of the
second claim raise the stakes a little? And how can we establish these requisite probabilities, or
even ranges of probability, without importing our values and intuitions? It is easy to see that,
especially when (as is almost always the case) a proposition involves several of these
probabilities in concert, it quickly becomes impossible even to provide a range such as van
Inwagen demands.
This is not even to mention the fact that the questions most relevant to us will normally
involve our values even more explicitly. In performing an environmental risk-assessment, we
need not only a good estimation of the odds of something going wrong and of the intensity of the
damage (difficult to estimate with any accuracy in most cases), but also of how much we wish or
require the benefits to be had from running the risk and how important it is to avoid the potential
damage.
In any of these cases, the assignment of numerical probabilities or ranges seems little
more than an attempt at impressing the reader with apparent mathematical rigour while covering
up the fact that one is only saying that an event is ‘really, really unlikely’ or something like that.
But in this case, shouldn’t we just be honest about what we are doing and drop the attempt at
probability theory entirely? Just how is one to arrive at a probability for God’s existence without
simply making it up?
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The turn to Informal Logic?
From the title of this paper, and the points I have made so far, it should be of no surprise
to anyone that I recommend we turn from formal logic (and more frequently, from the
counterfeit of formal logic) to informal logic in order to solve those problems where the
approach described above fails us. Informal logic, of course, does not attempt to prescribe in
advance all the modes of inference by which we can reach our conclusions legitimately, but
rather to help us to understand when and how arguments go wrong. While it has been assumed
by some people more familiar with formal than informal logic that the latter is merely a subset of
the former, a great many writers (most notably Hamblin) have given us ample reason to doubt
this. Further, in abandoning the idea of a limited number of legitimate types inference in our
reasoning, we also seem compelled to abandon the notion of assembling a comprehensive list of
fallacies (this may even be true for those who do wish to maintain the ‘limited legitimate moves’
proviso: as Richard Dawkins said famously, ‘There are a limited number of ways to be alive, but
infinitely more ways to be dead!’). Indeed, I am accusing Shalkowski and van Inwagen here of
committing fallacies – fallacies common to the parallel stories I have told – but I have a difficult
time finding traditional fallacies that match up neatly with what I think they are doing.
It is clear from this that informal logic is an approach to argument analysis that is worked
out largely from the ground up, rather than from the top down: instead of beginning and ending
with precise, a priori directions for how to conduct, examine and criticize our inferences, we
either supplement or replace such directions with a collection, necessarily incomplete, of errors
which in many cases are not clearly ruled out by any precise patterns of inference (for as we have
seen, we as humans are bound by the necessities of our lives, circumstances and interests to think
in ways regarding which formal logic can have nothing to say). But then our recognition of a
fallacy, and indeed our agreement that a particular sort of fallacy is a fallacy at all, must come
from an awareness of a non-formal type of absurdity, or perhaps merely from an awareness that
parallel arguments will lead to their own absurdities. Does this model, seeming to lack internal
completeness or even a clear, a priori method of testing the viability of an argument, for this
reason come out even worse off than the formal approach?
Certainly, it is still an open question whether some a priori procedure might arise in the
case of individual fallacies: Hamblin holds out some hope for this (e.g. in his discussion of
begging the question on p.192), while John McPeck suspects that, while we may find general
rules within a field, there are no overarching criteria for spotting fallacies that can be used in all
fields. Don S. Levi, one of informal logic’s boldest champions, demonstrates that many familiar
fallacies (like the ‘straw man’ fallacy invoked earlier) can never be reduced to an analysis merely
of formal argumentative structure, and for this reason denies that the concept of fallacy is even of
value in testing the correctness of an argument (p.7). However, while I agree with Levi’s
thinking up to this point, I part company with him here, for reasons explained in the following
argument.
What is it, aside from yet another strange unspoken assumption of modern philosophy,
that makes us think that a method of testing or doing something must be mechanizable? In other
words, why do we think that a good method must show us a procedure for going about things in
the same way (or limited set of ways) each time we are in a similar situation – such that those
who take a different path can automatically be criticised in light of the method? Equally
important, why must the method act as a substitution for the ways in which we are normally
inclined to solve the problems at hand, rather than as a means of improving on what we already
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would have done if we had found ourselves in that situation before beginning to learn the
method? This is important, for if it is legitimate to incorporate skills we already have into the
methods we are to use, without being able to define those skills precisely or to explain how they
work or what they will lead us to do in every last case, then the entire problem of informal logic
that I am considering in this section dissolves.
And yet it is considered legitimate in most places where we see methods (or systems) in
place. We read about a new, hybrid system in the martial arts, or about Petrosian’s method of
playing chess; but we do not expect this to mean that Petrosian or the martial artists will be able
to work out systematically just what to do in any situation, or even that it would be impossible to
do something rather different without violating the principles of the system. People learning
other skills, such as carpentry or – and it is surprising that philosophers would seem to miss this
– the writing of papers are never expected to abandon entirely their preconceptions as to how
words or blocks of wood are to fit together so that a new method can be taught from the ground
up; nor do several decades’ worth of work on AI give one great hope that this is even possible.
Even if it is possible – even if, I should say, it is possible for a human being to learn to do
something as complicated as thinking through an argument or writing a good essay in such a
manner, which seems extremely unlikely given our life-spans-- it is not at all clear why we
should recommend that people think and write in such a roundabout way when there are clearly
far better alternatives.
Even in cooking, where a priori recipes are more or less followed by many practitioners,
all kinds of deviations from those recipes are permitted when they are in line with the good ‘food
sense’ that the cook will have to some degree before learning to cook and will cultivate – not
replace -- through experience. While this sense is powerful enough to distinguish good
deviations from the recipe from bad ones, it is quite probably not mechanizable. Need we deny,
seemingly parallel with Levi, that this cook’s ‘ sense’ is of value in testing the merits of this or
that culinary innovation, simply because this does not square with the definition of method as
used by most philosophers– a definition that is much more the exception than the norm? For that
matter, need we deny that the answers philosophy students give to essay questions on exams give
professors criteria for assessing the students’ understanding of the subject, because there is no a
priori procedure for marking such questions and different professors may mark the questions
differently – in which case all philosophy professors should evaluate all their students only in
ways that allow for no difference of opinion or use of intuition among markers, and only use
essay and exam questions that can be answered without the students’ own non-mechanizable
judgement coming into play?? Perhaps Levi only means to distinguish the everyday usage of the
word ‘test’ from this mechanical one. But this interpretation of his words does not fit in with
what he goes on to say in that section, a fact which is incidentally an example of what I have just
been describing. It is clear that I have used the context of his remarks to test whether my
interpretation of his usage is correct, despite the fact that I did not follow any clearly defined
procedure in doing so.
A second possible difficulty is that, given that this conception of informal logic does not
give us a priori and unbendable rules for resolving arguments, someone who is clearly losing an
argument may be able to evade refutation forever by making an endless series of objections, or
just by denying that the judgement exercised by the other side is reasonable. While this is
certainly possible, and indeed sometimes to be expected, it has been shown (e.g. by Philip
Kitcher (pp.34-54) and Frank Cioffi (pp.10-11)) that any workable notion of falsification and
falsification evasion must rely on non-formalizable reasoning to a substantial degree, if only
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tacitly. If anything, it would probably be more effective to rely on informal logic or
argumentation theory here than on formal logic, where the most obvious moves against such an
unfair interlocutor (e.g. showing that the interlocutor would not and does not use such forms of
thinking in everyday and obvious cases) is strictly speaking ruled out of legitimate discussion.
Finally, by arguing along informal rather than formal lines we are apt to lose a small
measure of security: whereas a formal disproof of Shalkowski and van Inwagen (if possible)
would, supposing I had correctly understood their arguments and discovered their errors, leave
the matter settled, as it is there is some chance that they can rise up against me again by showing
that my invented stories are not really parallel, or that the situation is more murky than I have
made out, etc. But while this weakens my position somewhat, I prefer, as I think all
philosophers should, to allow free rein to human reason and invention even when it may leave us
with more work than we would choose: in other words, as philosophers we should not allow our
desire for tidiness and completeness to overcome our wish to know things as they really are, in
all their complexity.

Conclusion
If we are ready to take this turn and to replace the formal logical model lurking in the
background of philosophy with an informal logical one, if we are ready to grant that an abstract
analysis of an argument is often useless in practice until we can see what it is our interlocutor is
trying to say and to what end, then many questions about philosophy which are now considered
merely historical or sociological can be understood to have central importance in the intellectual
tradition we have inherited; and vital in helping us see a way forward by dispelling the myth that
we are thinking and working in an ahistorical framework and could as easily have arrived at our
modern system from just anywhere that fostered thinking and debate.
We have inherited our tradition from the presocratic philosophers, with their mystical
tendencies and beliefs in the magical properties of numbers; from Plato, who considered the
ideal world of forms to be more real and important than that in which we live; and from
Aristotle, who for all his valiant and often successful attempts to understand the subtleties of
politics and ethics on human terms, was deeply influenced by twenty years at Plato’s Academy
and who was considerably de-humanized by his interpreters over the next two millenia. We have
inherited it, also, from early Christian scholars, who interpreted classical philosophy in
accordance with the dictates of their religion and took seriously the idea that we now see only
through a glass darkly, and that only in heaven will we see things as they really are – from
people who learned and taught philosophy in an environment that cherished the intellectual and
spiritual habits of contemptus mundi. It is perhaps not difficult to see why such people would not
perceive the practical inapplicability of the logic they developed to be serious defect.
We have inherited scepticism about external objects from the Pyrrhonists through Sextus
Empiricus, it is true; but Sextus makes clear that his purposes are not the attainment of practical
or even abstract truth, but rather “quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling
in respect of things unavoidable” (pp.23-24). Had not Shalkowski considered the reasons for our
saying something to be wholly separable from what we say, he could not fairly have withheld
this information, making obvious as it does a major difference between scepticism about external
objects and scepticism about God.
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We have inherited our tradition through centuries of medieval universities, in which
innovators who, like Jean Buridan, invoked something other than Aristotelian syllogistic logic as
a basis for natural philosophy or ethics had their great innovations die with them and later had
their views condemned (in Buridan’s case, most famously by Jean Gerson) as heretical.
Ours is a tradition which, many centuries later, put forth such great thinkers as Descartes
and Hume, both of whom argued that syllogistic and formal logical methods are inimical to
productive thinking, and both of whom ran into serious difficulties with universities later on
when their new philosophies, unrestrained by the strictures of formal logic and abstract thinking,
naturally led in directions deemed religiously dangerous. Not that religious heresy and
syllogistic heresy always went hand in hand – Locke is a good example of a philosopher who
attacked formal logic and steered clear of religious trouble. But it is interesting that we now
typically present sanitized versions of all three of these philosophers: there is no longer anything
taboo about discussing their religious inclinations, but we often neglect to mention to students
how opposed they were to the sort of reasoning we sometimes explicitly use to formalize their
arguments!
And finally, in the relatively short time since the universities have been free from
religious oversight, the most renowned atheistic philosophers (e.g. Russell) have simply accepted
this background structure of formal logic as a matter of tradition. Many 20th century
philosophers continued the practice of ducking the issue of the inapplicability of formal logical
thinking to vast areas of philosophical interest not for religious reasons but rather by new, ad hoc
tactics. These include declaring by fiat that huge areas of philosophy are not philosophy at all,
and that philosophers just ought not concern themselves with meta-philosophy (after having
accepted, of course, the meta-philosophical presuppositions that modern philosophy seldom
bothers to argue for, and only then kicking away the ladder). It seems pleasantly fitting that the
counterintuitive arguments of Shalkowski, van Inwagen, and even Plantinga for the
reasonableness of theistic belief appear to stand strong against the techniques of both the
tradition of formal analysis (whose history is inseparable from a yearning for the otherworldly)
and the tradition of textual criticism and hermeneutics (whose history, of course, stems from
biblical criticism and the idea of an infinitely intelligent author) yet fall easily at the hands of an
emerging approach based on informal logic and argumentation theory. It is my hope that, with
attention, these humble beginnings may grow into a truly humanistic tradition in philosophy.
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